Guilty

 

On October 26, 1979, a series of gunshots at the Blue House dramatically altered the Republic of Korea's history. A single gunshot marked the end of Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial regime, seemingly signalling the start of democratisation, referred to as the Spring of Seoul. However, in the shadows, a new power group coalesced around Chun Doo-Hwan. In the wake of the 10.26 incident's power vacuum, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan seized control, orchestrating a military coup d’état on December 12, 1979. In this cover story, The Sogang Herald explores the legality of the events that extended authoritarian governance in the Republic of Korea, as depicted in the film 12. 12: The Day.

 

Guilty: The Defense Security Command

After the 10.26 incident, the most dramatic shift was the disruption of the power balance among the three key authorities of the post-Park regime: the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), the Presidential Security Service (PSS), and the Defense Security Command (DSC)^[1]. Initially, these entities were carefully balanced by President Park, who selected their leaders to ensure no single group could dominate. This balance was shattered with the president's assassination by the KCIA director, alongside the chief of the Presidential Security Service. This left the positions at the PSS and KCIA empty and led to Choi Kyu-hah, a figurehead, stepping in as acting president. Consequently, the DSC emerged as the preeminent power. The declaration of martial law further amplified the DSC’s influence, entrusting it with the role of the Joint Investigation Headquarters^[2], thus broadening its investigative and intelligence powers. Empowered to detain anyone, the DSC solidified its position as the epicentre of authority.

The DSC is accused of several serious violations, notably the misuse of intelligence for orchestrating a coup d’état. This misuse became evident when they targeted General Jeong Seung-Hwa, the Army Chief of Staff, who was present during the 10.26 incident. The decision to detain the Army Chief of Staff, especially without solid proof of wrongdoing, is in itself an egregious overstep. Moreover, following his arrest, the DSC subjected the Army Chief to interrogation at the Seobingo office, a place infamous for its harsh interrogation methods, including torture. This act not only crosses legal boundaries but also constitutes an act of rebellion.

Furthermore, the DSC engaged in the manipulation of army communications and the spread of misinformation. By intercepting army communications, the DSC utilised this advantage during the 12.12 coup to preempt and neutralise potential countermeasures. They were proactive in demoralising or neutralising other army factions that might have acted against the coup. A notable instance involved the 30th division. The Army Headquarters had directed the division to establish a defensive perimeter around the Haengju Bridge, a critical access point to the capital, to halt the advance of the coup forces. However, being aware of these orders, the DSC communicated directly with the 30th division, managing to pacify any resistance and thus ensuring that the Haengju Bridge was seized without resistance or conflict.

 

Guilty: Hanahoe

Hanahoe, an illicit clandestine group within the military, was established by officers from the 11th military academy and counted Chun Doo-Hwan among its members. This secret society was characterised by the exchange among army officers of information and assignments that could potentially lead to personal benefits or promotions.

The presence of a secret society within the military constitutes a grave offence. Compounding this, Hanahoe monopolised significant military positions, disrupting the established army command structure. This monopoly allowed Hanahoe members to ascend to the highest ranks of the military. Such positioning proved advantageous during the coup, as a substantial number of soldiers chose to follow the directives of Hanahoe members over those of their immediate superiors.

Among the numerous offences attributed to Hanahoe, their actions during the 12.12 coup stand out as particularly indefensible. A critical misstep involved moving the frontline unit stationed at the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)^[3] without the consent of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Given that operational control of the Korean military lay with the US Army, any troop movements required American approval. Nevertheless, Roh Tae-woo, a member of Hanahoe and leader of the 9th division, redeployed his forces to the Seoul area to support the coup, bypassing this protocol. This manoeuvre left a critical defence gap along the MDL, heightening the risk of external aggression.

Additionally, Hanahoe’s actions during the 12.12 coup included the egregious act of disobeying direct orders from their immediate superiors and engaging in attacks against fellow servicemen. Specifically, Hanahoe officers commanded three airborne battalions to take control of both the Army Headquarters and the Ministry of National Defense, aiming to detain their direct commander, the Special Forces Commander. Contravening military protocol, these battalions not only arrested their superior officer but also ignored commands to stand down, continuing their offensive operations.

Finally, Hanahoe members interfered with the execution of legitimate military commands. Officers associated with Hanahoe, while not always in the highest ranks, occupied strategic positions within the forces tasked with suppression, significantly hampering military responses. An instance of this occurred during efforts to deploy tank units to combat the rebel forces; these units, influenced by Hanahoe connections, defied mobilisation commands, choosing instead to follow Hanahoe directives. Consequently, adherence to Hanahoe’s commands over the established military hierarchy consistently thwarted any attempts at counterinsurgency, undermining the chain of command.

 

Guilty: Chun Doo-Hwan

Chun Doo-Hwan, in charge of both the DSC and the Joint Investigation Headquarters, faced rumours of potential demotion. In response, he leveraged the concentrated investigative capabilities and information dominance of the DSC and the Joint Investigation Headquarters for personal gain, orchestrating a coup d’état. His leadership roles in the DSC, the Joint Investigation Headquarters, and Hanahoe positioned him as a powerful figure, enabling him to act without fear.

Despite Chun Doo-Hwan’s confidence in the success of the 12.12 coup, he faced a significant legal hurdle: obtaining presidential approval. As the leader of the Joint Investigation Team, arresting a higher-ranking officer and martial law commander during a state of emergency necessitated permission from the president. Whether due to recklessness or overconfidence, Chun Doo-Hwan initiated the arrest operation on the assumption that he could secure the president’s approval during the process. However, Acting President Choi Kyu-hah declined to grant permission while the martial law commander was already detained by the rebel forces, leaving undeniable evidence of a coup d’état. In the aftermath, President Choi Kyu-hah was coerced into giving his consent. To highlight the irregularity of the arrest process, he meticulously recorded the time of his forced approval, closing a controversial chapter in legal history.

 

Not Guilty

In 1995, under the governance of a civilian administration^[4], the individuals implicated in the coup underwent investigation. The prosecution, while recognizing the events of 12.12 as a coup, deemed the transfer of power as beyond judicial scrutiny, essentially adopting the stance that a successful coup d'état could not be subject to punishment. Additionally, they found a lack of adequate evidence to charge the accused with further offences. This stance, however, was met with significant public opposition.

Following this, the Special Act of 5.18 was introduced to reevaluate the legal foundation, culminating in the prosecution of all those involved in the rebellion. In the initial trial, Chun Doo-Hwan, a central figure among the insurgents, received a death sentence. However, upon appeal, this sentence was reduced to life imprisonment, accompanied by a fine of around ₩220 billion. Other participants in the rebellion were also handed down significant sentences.

However, approximately eight months later, Chun Doo-Hwan received a presidential pardon in a move towards national unity, being granted amnesty. Additionally, when it came to confiscating his assets gained through corruption, tracking down Chun Doo-Hwan’s wealth proved challenging. Chun Doo-Hwan infamously claimed to have just ₩290,000 to his name. Consequently, the authorities were only able to reclaim 50% of the imposed fines. Despite initially receiving a death sentence, Chun Doo-Hwan was later observed engaging in leisure activities such as golfing and dining at upscale restaurants with others involved in the 12.12 coup. Essentially acquitted in practice, he continued living his life without observable consequences, even while under the shadow of a death sentence. This situation raised critical questions about the integrity of the legal system and whether it could command respect when severe breaches of law and order could go relatively unpunished.

 

출처: 동아일보

To Prevent Being Found Not Guilty…

While their legal guilt is established, in a broader societal sense, they could almost be seen as having skirted real accountability. With the passing of former President Chun Doo-Hwan, no new legal actions can be initiated, nor can further public admonitions affect him directly. However, allowing his deeds to fade from collective memory risks absolving him posthumously. The film 12. 12: The Day played a pivotal role in reigniting public discourse about his actions. Its success not only brought his transgressions back into public consciousness but also cast a spotlight on the injustices of the 12.12 coup. In its third cover story, The Sogang Herald delves into the portrayal of these events within the film through a conversation with the scriptwriter of 12. 12: The Day, exploring the depiction of these dark chapters in Korea’s history.

출처: YTN

 

By Do-Goon Kim (Campus Editor)

kdg0303@sogang.ac.kr