“South Korea and the Nuclear Puzzle: Is Self-Nuclear Armament the Answer?”

“Of course, if the problem becomes more serious, we may deploy tactical nuclear weapons here in Korea, or we may have our own nuclear weapons.” 

On January 11, President Yoon Seok-Yeol’s remarks reignited the debate about the nuclear armament of Korea. Although the Washington Declaration has strengthened South Korea’s ability to protect itself, its evaluation was divided between experts and the general public. For experts, it was hailed as the best agreement, yet the public criticized the concession as a hurdle in the way of self-nuclear armament. It is evident that aspirations for self-nuclear armament remain in Korean society. Thus, in this column, The Sogang Herald will examine the Washington Declaration, the history and meaning of self-nuclear armament, and the necessity and possibility of self-nuclear armament through a multi-faceted analysis. 

What is Self-Nuclear Armament?

Self-nuclear armament refers to acquiring the ability to deploy nuclear weapons without depending on a foreign nation such as the United States of America. South Korea has made several attempts at nuclear armament in the past. Under the Park Chung-hee administration, the country established the Arms Development Committee and the Defense Science Research Institute. South Korea acquired nuclear-reprocessing technology from France, imported heavy water reactors from Canada, and obtained missile technology from the United States. With the fundamental requirement of nuclear development met, only the development phase was left for South Korea to achieve nuclear armament. However, the fear of the US pressure and sanctions led to the termination of nuclear development in 1976. During the new military administration led by Chun Doo-hwan, a nuclear development plan utilizing plutonium, a radioactive material used to produce nuclear weapons, was promoted in 1982, extracting a significant amount of plutonium. Yet when the United States government became aware of these activities, Chun Doo-hwan was forced to abandon the nuclear program in 1983. 

Even after the civilian government took office, South Korea clandestinely conducted experiments related to uranium conversion, enrichment, and plutonium separation until the 21^st century. However, these activities were halted once again due to special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Subsequently, there were no significant developments until the Yoon Seok-yeol administration, which sparked heated debates on self-nuclear armament until official remarks regarding the conditional self-development of nuclear weapons were made. The discussions continued until the Washington Declaration was presented to the public.

This Washington Declaration was also one of America’s acts for quelling Korea’s aspirations for nuclear armament. The Washington Declaration gives South Korea a central role in the strategic planning for the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict with North Korea. In return, South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear arsenal. 

                                  ©Office of the President of the Republic of Korea                

Views on the Washington Declaration are divided, with some reacting positively to a more conventional weapons arrangement and more influence on America’s nuclear weapons. However, others criticize the move as it completely abandons the option to develop and possess Korea’s own nuclear arsenal. One expert argues that the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group is the best choice for the United States, concerned about the domino effect leading to nuclear proliferation, and the Korean government, seeking to secure extended deterrence. He emphasizes the importance of constantly exerting Korea’s influence on America’s nuclear weapon control by implementing the NCG.

On the other hand, experts on the other side argue that the Washington Declaration is the complete waving of the right to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Also, they are suspicious about the faithful implementation of the declaration under a radical right-wing government, citing the example of President Trump. Furthermore, they point out that the Korean government fails to revise the Korea-US Nuclear Agreement, which imposes stringent conditions on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment compared to the US-Japan Nuclear Agreement. So far, we’ve looked at the self-nuclear armament itself and Korea’s failed attempts. At this point, this column intends to pose a question. “Do the Koreans really think that the self-nuclear armament is required?” 

“Does the Korean Public Want a Nuclear Arsenal?”

In some surveys, it seems that there are aspirations for self-nuclear armament among Koreans. According to Gallup Korea surveys conducted in the 2010s, approximately 50-60% of the public expressed support for nuclear development. More than half of the population holds a favorable view of the concept of nuclear armament. According to the Hankook Ilbo/Hankook Research New Year’s opinion poll, 66.8% of respondents (34.0% strongly agree, 32.8% generally agree) agreed with the claim that South Korea should possess nuclear weapons. In contrast, only 31.8% disagreed with this claim. Across different ideological affiliations, more than half of liberals (54.4%), moderates (70.7%), and conservatives (69.5%) agreed with the idea of South Korea possessing nuclear weapons. When asked about the United States' stance in the event of a military clash between the two Koreas, only 36.7% of respondents believed that the United States would unconditionally support South Korea. A more significant portion (53.6%) thought the United States may or may not intervene based on self-interests. Some respondents even suggested that the United States might not intervene due to concerns about burden-sharing (4.1%). Despite the 70-year history of the ROK-US alliance, there is an underlying consciousness that blind trust and reliance on the United States may not be advisable in emergency situations.

©Hankookilbo

However, the 2023 Asan Institute for Policy Studies survey revealed some important points. When the possibility of sanctions was not mentioned, 64.3% agreed, and 33.3% disagreed with self-nuclear armament. But, when the possibility of sanctions was introduced, the percentage of agreement decreased to 54.7%—simply mentioning the possibility of sanctions led to a decrease of about 10% in support. It can be inferred that the lack of accurate information about international sanctions and potential risks might contribute to the public’s support of the self-nuclear armament process. Also, from a political psychology paper that focused on the relationship between Korean’s opinion about self-nuclear armament and knowledge about the consequences that Korea will face if the self-nuclear armament happens, 58% of participants who support the self-nuclear armament changed their decision after getting information about opposing arguments such as international sanctions and economic disadvantages. Also, 32% of participants who opposed the self-nuclear armament changed their minds after getting information about consenting arguments. All these facts mean that Koreans require more information about self-nuclear armament and its consequences for making their true decisions. Therefore, it seems crucial to convey detailed information about the necessity, feasibility, and possible outcomes of pursuing self-nuclear armament.

Is Self-Nuclear Armament Necessary?

The need for self-nuclear armament is underscored in a country like South Korea, where a hostile nation, North Korea, is aiming its nuclear arsenal at it. In September 2022, North Korea legalized “nuclear weapons legislation,” explicitly stating the possibility of preemptive nuclear strikes. Until now, North Korea has maintained an attitude of possessing nuclear weapons for self-defense, but this legal provision opens up the possibility of preemptive strikes. Nuclear weapons give a nation overwhelming asymmetric power, which traditional conventional weapons find difficult to counter. Therefore, the concept of “mutually assured destruction” is crucial for peace. MAD refers to a state where the annihilation of both the aggressor and the defender is certain. Therefore, no entity will preemptively strike a nation with a nuclear weapon. If one side launches a nuclear attack, the other side will also respond with their nuclear weapons, resulting in the complete destruction of both parties without gaining any advantage. In this regard, South Korea is highly vulnerable to a nuclear attack from North Korea. Relying solely on conventional weapons is almost impossible to counter nuclear threats.

©KCNA

Some might think that America will act as a nuclear umbrella for South Korea. However, distrust towards the United States is hard to overcome for South Koreans. Trump’s America First policy, popularly known as MAGA, shattered the image of the United States as the world’s sole superpower that had been established since becoming the only leading power in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the four years of the Trump era, the United States emphasized its prioritization of national interests over the interests of allies and did not hesitate to show this stance. Even during the Biden era, the United States refrained from direct intervention to avoid a military conflict with Russia. This demonstrated how fragile the US commitment to defending South Korea is in the face of asymmetric power like nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, doubts and suspicions about whether the United States would assist Korea, even at the risk of a preemptive strike, are dominating Korean society.

Furthermore, possessing a nuclear weapon gives a nation unparallel diplomatic and political leverage over the other. In fact, during the Park Chung-hee administration, South Korea gained access to advanced nuclear power technology by abandoning nuclear weapons development. Even without developing nuclear weapons, there are considerable benefits to be gained from utilizing this situation. With the benefit outweighing the risk, the debate over nuclear weapons development continues.

Is Self-Nuclear Armament Possible?

Regardless of the necessity of nuclear weapons development, the question remains regarding the feasibility of nuclear development. Technically, it is possible. South Korea already possesses reprocessing and enrichment technologies that can be used to develop a nuclear weapon and can produce a prototype with a yield of 20 kilotons (kt) within six months if there is a political decision. While it is possible, it is politically and economically catastrophic. First, the United States will never consent to South Korea possessing its own nuclear arsenal, fearing South Korea will create a Domino effect leading to nuclear proliferation, which is evident based on its past actions against the nuclear development program of South Korea, Iran, North Korea, South Africa, Israel, and Libya.

So, what if South Korea were to develop nuclear weapons without the consent of the United States and endure international sanctions? In such a case, international sanctions would be inevitable. With crippling sanctions from the international community, the Korean economy would likely be paralyzed as it is an export-oriented nation. With an economy mainly based on exporting finished goods such as semiconductors and cargo ships, which heavily depend on imported goods as their raw material, economic sanctions will destabilize the nation’s industrial foundation, leading to economic collapse. 

Some might suggest Korea follows the path of Pakistan and India, which successfully developed nuclear weapons despite enduring international sanctions. However, Pakistan and India were in a different situation compared to South Korea. There are three key factors that contribute to this distinction.

First, India and Pakistan had a low economic dependency on the United States. Until the late 1980s, when they were actively pursuing nuclear development, both economies were composed of primary industries, such as agriculture, that enabled them to withstand US economic sanctions without suffering significant blows. In the late 1970s, when the sanctions were imposed, India’s import/export ratio to GDP was just over 10%. Pakistan also had a lower export-import ratio and a higher dependence on agriculture. Therefore, the limitations of US-led sanctions were evident. Additionally, there is no guarantee that South Korea could swiftly recover from such sanctions, as India and Pakistan did in the past.

Secondly, South Korea is a democratic country. If its export-driven economy were to be hit by sanctions, public opinion domestically would deteriorate, potentially leading to a change in government in the next election. A newly elected government would likely abandon pursuing nuclear weapons and return to the NPT based on economic considerations. Consequently, it can be concluded that it is highly improbable that Korea will develop a nuclear weapon.

A risky Gambit

Nuclear armament seems necessary in the face of the North Korean nuclear threat and weak commitment from the U.S. However, factors such as condemnation from the international community and possible economic sanctions are too significant a risk to pursue Korea’s nuclear program. Therefore, South Korea’s self-nuclear armament is a risky gambit while a safer, more diplomatic resolution still exists.

By Park Jeonghyun (cub reporter)
j010704@sogang.ac.kr